The authors propose a behavioral decision theory relevant to the maintenance of desirable identities. The theory, termed deviance regulation theory (DRT), predicts that actions translate into meaningful identities to the extent that they cause the individual to deviate from reference group norms. This straightforward proposition is used to predict the patterning of behavior across a wide array of social contexts. The authors present evidence that predictions generalize across Eastern and Western cultures and to both personal and collective identities. Finally, they show how DRT alters current theoretical assumptions about social motives and social and cultural influence, and they illustrate how it can help explain the structure of both informal and formal social forces.
In many ways, the qualities that define us are those that distinguish us. In our own eyes, and in others', we are that which makes us different. This idea was clearly articulated in early attribution models, wherein it was argued that we infer dispositions from a person's actions when similar people would not engage in similar actions in similar situations (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976; Kelley, 1972) . More recent evidence can be found in research on the self-concept. People represent the self in terms of its distinct attributes more than its common attributes, and they view their uncommon attributes as more defining of the self than their common attributes (Lay, Burron, & Jackson, 1973; McGuire & McGuire, 1980; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976; Nelson & Klutas, 2000; Nelson & Miller, 1995; Turnbull, Miller, & McFarland, 1990) . Perhaps as a result, people base their global self-evaluations on their evaluations of their rare qualities more than their common qualities, and they maintain positive self-evaluations by projecting their undesirable qualities onto others (Campbell, 1986; Ditto & Griffin, 1993; Marks, 1984; Mullen & Goethals, 1990; Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1984) .
In the current article, we propose a behavioral decision theory that is based on the assumption that behavioral difference defines the individual. In its boiled-down form, our theory predicts that people maintain desired self-views by regulating how they differ from others. Stated more precisely, we propose a theory that we term deviance regulation theory (DRT), which predicts that people try to maintain positive public and private self-images by choosing desirable ways of deviating from social norms and by avoiding undesirable ways of deviating from social norms. We are thus suggesting that people try to "stick out" from others in good ways but not in bad ways. Although this prediction seems fairly straightforward, it can lead to a wide range of non-obvious predictions about behavioral decision making, the nature of social influence, and the structure of formal and informal social forces within and across societies and cultures. It does this by highlighting an asymmetry in the concern that people place on similarity versus difference.
Although people are thought to regulate their actions around difference, they are not thought to regulate their actions around similarity. This suggests a natural framing of decisions when people are faced with a choice between two behavioral alternatives: one that is normative and one that is counternormative. When people are faced with such a choice, DRT predicts that attention will be drawn to the counternormative alternative. As a result, their decision will be made on the basis of the desirability of the counternormative choice more than the desirability of the normative choice. From this analysis, individuals tend to move toward or away from behavioral norms based on their attitudes toward deviating. To adapt a phrase from Harold Kelley, we are arguing that "difference engulfs the field" when people are faced with a choice of being similar or of being different.
In the sections that follow, we present the theoretical basis for DRT. We begin by explaining how actions influence a person's sense of self. This analysis first focuses on the cognitive mechanisms that cause actions to influence an actor's identity and the reasons why counternormative actions exert greater influence than normative actions. We then incorporate theoretical perspectives from reference group theory to show why actions have particularly powerful effects on one's identity when they cause one to deviate from the norms of important reference groups. We then use this expanded version of DRT to reveal consistencies in behavioral dynamics across a wide array of social and cultural contexts and to explain consistencies in the structure of both formal and informal social forces in Eastern as well as Western societies.
The Action and Identity Decision Process
We begin by elaborating on what we term the action and identity decision process. This is the basic mechanism by which people determine how possible future courses of action might influence their identities, were they to engage in them. In this framework, the term identity is used in its broadest sense to include any selfconception that might influence a person's sense of worth. Thus, an identity can refer to a person's conception of him-or herself as a talented person, as a moral person, or as a person with an appealing and likable personality. We assume that people are motivated to secure and maintain identities that help them gain social approval from meaningful others and inclusion in meaningful groups. We thus define an identity as desirable when it furthers these twin goals of acceptance and inclusion (see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Rosenberg, 1979; Tedeschi, 1989 ). An identity can be considered desirable in this sense either because it indicates the presence of positive attributes that facilitate acceptance and inclusion or because it indicates the absence of negative attributes that hinder acceptance and inclusion.
Cognitive Building Blocks: What Sticks?
One way to conceptualize the action and identity decision process is to view the individual as trying to determine whether or not an action will "stick." An action will stick when it will cause either the actor or observers to draw inferences about the actor's identity. To illustrate, imagine that you are in the audience at the plenary address of the annual conference of the American Psychological Association (APA). When the talk comes to an end, you consider asking a question. As you reflect on what you would like to ask, you realize that, in a perfect world, you would preface your inquiry with a statement along the lines of "Although I find most of the ideas you presented to be laughable at best, I do see a granule of insight in a brief aside you made near the beginning of your talk. Let me elaborate on that. . . ." Do you think you should ask your question in this way? We suspect not. In all likelihood, this action would stick to your identity. Others in attendance would see you as arrogant and rude, which would diminish your standing in their eyes. To the extent that you can anticipate this reaction, and to the extent that you would like to maintain a favorable impression with this audience, you would be wise not to state your question in this way. Later on, however, if you are in the company of a group that is critical of the speaker, you could express your opinions quite forcefully and with impunity. The presence of others who share your negative opinions can prevent your own criticisms from sticking to your identity.
A consideration of the stickiness of actions encourages an analysis of the "social prototypes" or mental representations that people hold of the typical person who engages in a given act (Cantor & Mischel, 1977) . Because people can become associated with these prototypes through their own actions, they seek actions that might cause positively valenced prototypes to stick to their identity and avoid ac-tions that might cause negatively valenced prototypes to stick to their identity (Blanton, Gibbons, Gerrard, Conger, & Smith, 1997; Niedenthal, Cantor, & Kihlstrom, 1985; Niedenthal & Mordkoff, 1991; see Gibbons & Gerrard, 1997 ). The prototype construct will have limited utility in the prediction of behavioral outcomes, however, when actions are not linked to a consensual prototype. In such instances, people can still anticipate the effects specific actions might have on their identities by taking the perspective of their audiences. It may be, for instance, that there is no consensual prototype associated with asking rude questions at a conference. Still, most psychologists can anticipate how their colleagues in attendance would evaluate this act. Through perspective taking, they can determine the effect this action might have on their image and therefore decide whether or not it would be a good idea to ask a question in this manner.
In most instances, and for most people, we expect actions to be pursued that cause desirable images to stick. In this use of the term image, we do not distinguish between a public image held by others and a private image held by the self. This is because the public view of the self that is projected out toward an audience can influence an actor's private identity. This will occur if the audience has reference group status in the interpretation of the self (Hyman, 1960; Hyman & Singer, 1968; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Sherif & Sherif, 1964; Singer, 1981) . We elaborate on this point in a later section, but, for now, we simply point out that we do not differentiate the decision process needed for the management of a public versus a private self-image. We assume that people want to maintain a desirable sense of self, both in their own eyes and in others', and we assume that "private" views of what is desirable often reflect the internalized views of important others (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985) .
Deviance Regulation Principle
We have explored one important determinant of the stickiness of an action, behavioral norms. By behavioral norms, we mean the prevailing base rates for actions. We label an action as "normative" when it is the typical choice that similar others would make in that situation and as "counternormative" or as "deviant" when it is not the typical choice that similar others would make in that situation. In this use of the term, deviance is not meant to imply a pejorative label or to signify an undesirable action. It is only meant to indicate that the person has engaged in an action that is not typical of similar others. A person may thus deviate in desirable ways or in undesirable ways, and so deviance may bring either praise or criticism.
In the first section of this article, we referenced attribution theory and research on the self-concept to explain why deviant actions are more informative than normative actions. This point can be made more clearly, however, by drawing parallels to gestalt principles of figureground relations (Koffka, 1935) . When an individual engages in counternormative actions, that person stands out from the perceptual ground and draws the attention of perceivers and evaluators. In contrast, when an individual engages in normative actions, that person blends into the perceptual ground and no longer draws the attention. This is illustrated in the three panels of Figure 1 . These panels show a graphical representation of a young adolescent trying to decide whether or not to take up smoking. In the first panel, we see the individual conjuring up two possible self-images, "me as a smoker" and "me as a nonsmoker." From a traditional decision perspective, the individual should compare evaluations of these two images and then choose the course of action that has the more favorable evaluation (Jaccard & Becker, 1985) . From a DRT perspective, only one of these evaluations will have a strong influence on behavioral decisions when there are strong behavioral norms surrounding this choice. This is illustrated in the second and third panels of Figure 1 .
In the second panel, the adolescent is making a smoking decision in a social context in which smoking is counternormative (i.e., in which most peers in the background are not smoking). In this social context, the individual can only stick out from the crowd and draw attention if he or she decides to smoke. For this reason, the individual should think carefully about the social consequences of choosing to smoke. If the "me as a smoker" image is viewed as socially desirable, then smoking could improve the actor's image. If the "me as a smoker" image is socially undesirable, then smoking could damage the actor's image. Regardless, the "me as a nonsmoker" image should have little social relevance, because choosing not to smoke would not make the actor a target of attention or evaluation. Thus, the individual in the second panel should decide on a course of action by deciding whether or not "me as a smoker" seems like a desirable image. Note how this changes when the norms surrounding this action change. In the third panel, we see that the individual can draw attention only by choosing not to smoke. In this context, the individual would grab attention for not smoking, and so this person should think carefully about the desirability of the "me as a nonsmoker" image. In contrast, smoking will cause the individual to blend into the social environment, and so the desirability of the "me as a smoker" image should be given little consideration.
This example was given to illustrate why actions should have a greater chance of sticking when they distinguish the self from others, instead of associating the self with others. 1 The dynamic portrayed in Figure 1 suggests there will typically be an asymmetry in the weight given to deviant versus normative actions when people make behavioral deci-1 The exception to this demonstrates the rule. At times, actions can contribute to an identity by associating the self with others-instead of distinguishing it from others-but this occurs in contexts in which these associations distinguish the self from some larger group of others. For instance, Brewer and Weber (1994) have shown that people base their self-evaluations on their association with a target of comparison to the extent that this association is statistically distinct. In this case, similarity with the target distinguishes the self from most others because most others do not share this same association with the target (see also Mullen, 1991; Turner et al., 1987) . This is a point that is elaborated in greater detail in later sections (see . sions based on identity concerns. Predictions based on this theorized asymmetry have been tested in a set of studies in our own laboratory. Consistent with DRT, we have found that college students' social desirability ratings of various health-risk behaviors (e.g., binge drinking and having unsafe sex) are more positively correlated with future intentions when they are also rated as uncommon on campus (Blanton & SanchezBurks, 2001; ). This suggests that, when students make behavioral decisions based on social desirability concerns, they give greater weight to the perceived social consequences of these acts the more the acts positively distinguish the self from similar others in the social environment.
Recently, we have explored the implications of this same asymmetry for the framing of social influence attempts Blanton, Stuart, & VandenEijnden, 2001; . If individuals base their behavioral decisions on their evaluations of being different, then social influence attempts should be more effective when they associate valenced traits with counternormative behavioral choices than when they associate valenced traits with normative behavioral alternatives. To test this prediction, we (Blanton, Stuart, & VandenEijnden, 2001 , Study 1) exposed participants to one of two fictitious newspaper articles that gave bogus information about the norm surrounding flu shots. Both versions informed participants that a flu epidemic was expected on campus and that a campaign was being mounted to encourage immunizations. One version stated that, on the basis of past research, it was anticipated that the vast majority of students at the university would get flu shots. The other version stated that, on the basis of past research, it was anticipated that only a minority of students at the university would get flu shots. Participants then read either a positively framed or a negatively framed message encouraging immunization. The positively framed message emphasized the desirable attributes of people who get flu shots (e.g., they are "responsible" and "considerate of others"), and the negatively framed message emphasized the undesirable attributes of people who do not get flu shots (e.g., they are "irresponsible" and "inconsiderate of others"). Following this manipulation, participants rated their own intention to get a flu shot in the future.
The results from this study are shown in Figure 2 . As anticipated, intentions to get a flu shot in the future were greater in the conditions targeting deviant actions. When participants were told that it was normative on campus to get a shot, their intentions to get a shot were higher following exposure to a negatively framed message emphasizing the undesirable identity of someone who does not get a shot. In contrast, when participants were told that it was normative on campus not to get a shot, their intentions to get a shot were higher following exposure to a positively framed message emphasizing the desirable identity of someone who does get a shot. In a follow-up study (Study 3), this same pattern was replicated in a quasi-experimental investigation that took advantage of natural variation in a normative belief. In this investigation, we found that previous normative beliefs about condom use moderated the effects of message framing on behavioral commitment to use condoms in the future, even after control for a large number of attitudes and attributes that covaried with normative beliefs. These studies provided strong evidence for the deviance regulation principle by showing that evaluations of actions are more predictive of behavioral decisions, to the extent that these actions are deviant as opposed to normative.
Conversational implicatures. The previous studies suggest that the deviance regulation principle structures responses to social influence and that it can be used either to elicit conformity or to elicit deviation. To encourage conformity, a communicator should associate negative attributes with deviance (not positive attributes with conformity). To encourage deviation, a communicator should associate positive attributes with deviance (not negative attributes with conformity). In each instance, the communicator takes advantage of the individual's goal of maintaining a socially desirable identity. To this end, the communicator tries to move the individual toward or away from deviation, not toward or away from conformity.
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In a second line of research, we have argued that the deviance regulation principle also structures communicators' influence attempts. On the basis of their knowledge of behavioral norms and their implicit understanding of the deviance regulation principle, we expect communicators to frame their social influence attempts in ways that will maximize their impact on others (Grice, 1975; see Schwarz, 1996; Sperber & Wilson, 1986 ). Thus, people should frame their persuasive communications to characterize the attributes of people engaging in counternormative actions, not the attributes of people engaging in normative actions. In support of this prediction, research indicates that people construct causal accounts of behavior to describe the attributes of counternormative actors, not normative actors (D. T. Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991) . In further support, we have found that people resolve their uncertainty about existing behavioral norms by inferring behavioral norms backward from the message frame used in persuasive communications. We (Stuart & Blanton, 2003) conducted a study in which we first asked college students whether they thought other students at their university typically do or do not use condoms when they 2 This view does not have to be opposed to the selfverification perspective of Swann (1987) . This theory predicts that people with negative self-views will seek negative social feedback for the purpose of maintaining self-certainty. We argue that people seek social inclusion (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) . This will cause most people in most situations to pursue distinctly positive images and to avoid distinctly negative images. Nevertheless, some people with negative self-views may seek association with distinctly negative images and avoid distinctly positive images because their self-certainty needs are stronger than their social inclusion needs. Or they may seek the negative because this will facilitate their inclusion in reference groups that prefer seeing them in a negative light (see . Even in these situations, we expect the deviance-regulation principle to apply. We expect people to regulate their identity around difference, whether it is for the purpose of cultivating a negative identity or a positive identity. Because we do not expect this to be the common motive for most people, we do not discuss this dynamic further. have sex. Participants responded by checking either "yes" or "no" and then rated their confidence in their initial assessment, using an 11-point scale. After this, participants read either a positively framed or negatively framed statement promoting condom use. These communications were similar to the ones used by Blanton, Stuart, and VandenEijnden (2001) , except that they were presented as the written views of a female student on campus. After reading one of these two testimonials, participants again estimated the prevalence of condom use on their campus, this time using an 11-point scale ranging from low prevalence (0) to high prevalence (10).
Our primary prediction was that participants would infer behavioral norms for condom use from the speaker's choice of message frames. If the speaker chose to stress the positive attributes of people who use condoms, she was implicitly stating that she thought condom users were worthy of comment. If she instead chose to stress the negative attributes of people who do not use condoms, she was implicitly stating that she thought non-condom users were worthy of comment. According to the deviance regulation principle, the positive frame should thus convey the speaker's belief that condom use is uncommon, whereas the negative frame should convey the speaker's belief that condom use is common (see also Donaldson, Graham, Piccinin, & Hansen, 1995) . These inferences about the speaker's normative assumptions should then influence the participants' own assumptions, to the extent that they used the speaker's own assumptions as their own. We expected them to do this when they were uncertain about the norms for condom use. Our secondary prediction was that message framing effects would influence the participants' own normative assumptions if they were uncertain about behavioral norms before message exposure.
Results supported both predictions. After reading the communication, participants' prevalence assumptions varied as a function of message frame and prior certainty. As shown in Figure 3 , among those who were uncertain, the positively framed message lowered prevalence assumptions for condom use relative to the negatively framed message. Among those who were already certain, the message frame had no effect. Importantly, this general pattern of results held even after initial norm estimation had been controlled.
Summary. It thus appears that deviant acts stick to one's identity to a greater extent than normative acts. For this reason, social influence attempts should be effective when they praise or condemn counternormative acts, not when they praise or condemn normative acts. Because communicators are intuitively aware of this principle, we expect them to adopt message frames that emphasize the social consequences of being different, and we expect them to assume that others are doing the same when they construct their own communications.
What Matters?
Although the evidence supports the theorized asymmetry between the stickiness of deviant versus normative actions, a framework that tries to predict behavior on the basis of this principle alone will meet with limited success. Many times, deviant actions may stick, but the consequences of these acts will be of little concern to the individual. Consider as an example a college sophomore who consistently falls asleep in the front of class. In an otherwise courteous classroom, this student might gain an image as a "slacker." Will this outcome influence the student's identity in a positive or a negative way? On the basis of our interactions with such students in the past, we suspect neither. This student probably does not care about the image created by the decision to sleep (or by the decision not to stay awake). Falling asleep in class thus reveals neither an intent to acquire a slacker image nor a failed attempt at avoiding it. Any effect this decision has on this student's image will be little more than a side effect of a decision process influenced by other considerations.
As this example illustrates, the simple fact that an action will stick does not mean that it will hold psychological significance for the actor. To determine the psychological significance of an individual's action, it is necessary to determine whether it will stick in a way that is important to this person. To put it another way, it is necessary to determine whether the action will matter. In his seminal volume on the self, William James (1890) argued that the importance a person attaches to an identity will determine the motivational and evaluative impact it will have on the self. He provided a wellknown illustration of this when he professed his willingness to "wallow in the grossest ignorance of Greek." Since this time, many models of self-esteem have incorporated James's assumption that people value some identities more than others (Harter, Whitesell, & Junkin, 1998; Pelham & Swann, 1989; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1986) . Although support for this "Jamesian hypothesis" has proven elusive (Marsh, 1995) , current evidence supports the general statement that self-evaluation is influenced more by important self-views than unimportant ones (Pelham, 1995) . It is a reasonable extension of this to argue that people are motivated to regulate actions that will have important influences on their identity more than they are motivated to regulate ones that will not.
To shift from predicting when an action will stick to predicting when it will matter, we must shift from studying the descriptive inferences people make about their actions to studying the evaluative inferences they make. In our earlier attempts to model the behavioral decision process, we mapped out a comparison process by which actions were measured against a descriptive standard: the behavioral norm observed in the immediate social environment. As D. T. Miller and Prentice (1996) have pointed out, however, the psychological significance of actions is more typically captured by a comparison process in which acts are measured against evaluative standards. This point was elaborated in the early comparison theories developed within the sociological tradition (Hyman, 1960; Hyman & Singer, 1968; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Sherif & Sherif, 1964; Singer, 1981) . Sociologists noted that we care how we measure up in relation to the norms and standards of some groups more than others. They coined the term "reference group" to signify the groups that carry a high degree of psychological significance.
For the deviance regulation principle to be used to explain how we choose actions to maintain important identities, the theory surrounding it must consider comparisons between the self and the norms of important reference groups. Once this is done, the operationalization of the "norm" must change as well. The comparisons we make with reference groups are based less on observed patterns of behavior in the immediate social environment than on the beliefs we hold about what behaviors the group does or does not value. Thus, when we make decisions based on reference group concerns, we do not compare possible courses of action with behavioral base rates. We instead compare them with the opinions within the group (D. T. Miller & Prentice, 1996) . People regulate behavior relative to reference group norms by determining how possible courses of action might influence evaluative reactions within the group and by then choosing the response that will put them in the best position vis-à-vis these reactions. This can have dramatic consequences for behavior.
Reference Groups and Action
Reference groups appear to narrow the range of social motives that drive action. According to Singer (1981) , people become more oriented toward conformity and less oriented toward deviation when they respond to reference group norms. As he stated, "Broadly conceived, the consequence of normative reference orientations is conformity" (p. 69). Through socialization, he argued, reference groups give individuals a sense of what they should do, and this reduces the number of desirable options before them. As noted by Kelley (1968) , a "group functions as a normative reference group for a person to the extent that its evaluations of him are based upon the degree of his conformity to certain standards of behavior or attitude and to the extent that the delivery of rewards or punishments is conditional upon these evaluations" (p. 80). Individuals then signify the importance of the reference group by eliminating discrepancies between their actions and the expectations of the group (Hyman, 1960; Hyman & Singer, 1968; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Newcomb, 1950; Sherif & Sherif, 1964; Siegel & Siegel, 1957; Singer, 1981) . Through conformity to the expectations of the reference group, the individual gains a symbolic sense of inclusion in, or acceptance by, the group. This outcome can lead to an enduring sense of self-worth or selfesteem Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Rosenberg, 1979) .
Recall that deviance regulation can lead either to conformity striving (i.e., avoiding undesirable deviation) or to uniqueness striving (i.e., seeking desirable deviation). Because the reference-group literature suggests that reference groups only encourage conformity, it would ap-pear that reference groups influence the behavioral judgment process through a different regulatory mechanism than deviance regulation. Evidence suggests the contrary, however. People seem to decide on courses of action through comparisons with reference group norms using much the same decision process that they do when they are deciding on a course of action through comparison with behavioral norms. As will be seen, the deviance regulation principle determines the social consequences of deviating, as before. As a result of the social contingencies surrounding reference group norms, however, the decision outcome will most typically be a decision to conform (and thereby avoid bad deviance).
Norms as behavioral expectations. To build this argument, we must introduce a psychological definition of a "norm" to show how it causes deviant actions to be more informative than normative actions. A behavioral choice can be viewed as "normative" when it is seen as the default or typical response of the typical member of the group who encounters a similar situation. In most situations, perceivers will expect group members to engage in normative acts, and it is for this reason that deviance becomes informative. When a deviant choice is observed, this tells the perceiver that something surprising just occurred, requiring an explanation (Hilton & Slugoski, 1986) . To the extent that a deviant act cannot be explained through reference to a coinciding surprise in the situation, but it can be explained by reference to a theory relating identity to actions, then the deviant act should stick to the identity of the actor. By this analysis, the group in our earlier work on the deviance regulation principle was similar others in the immediate social environment, and the norm was the observed behavioral base rates of group members. Actions were viewed as informative when they differed from the responses that were believed to be typical for someone in the group, given what was learned about the group from observing base rates.
This logic can also be applied to reference groups when normative assumptions are based on the perceived values and opinions of the reference group. Reference groups create reward structures that tell their members what they must do to gain social approval. Individuals who live up to the normative prescriptions of the group merit inclusion, and those who do not merit exclusion (see Pyszczynski et al., 1997) . Given this reward structure, the default or typical response of the typical individual who values the group will be to conform to group opinions. Actions by members will thus have the potential to surprise and to be informative when they deviate from what is assumed to be typical for the group, given this known reward structure (see Reeder & Spores, 1983; Ybarra & Stephan 1996 .
According to the preceding analysis, there should be an asymmetry between the information value of normative versus counternormative actions when norms are operationalized in terms of the prescriptions of meaningful reference groups. Clear evidence of this is revealed in the difference in the information value of moral versus immoral behaviors. As a reference group, a civil society prescribes that its members make moral choices. Consistent with the deviance regulation principle, behavioral instances of immorality, such as dishonesty, are typically viewed as more informative of a person's underlying character than behavioral instances of morality, such as honesty (Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Skowronksi & Carlston, 1987) . This would suggest that, in most situations, a member of a civil society who is faced with a decision of whether or not to tell the truth will give greater weight to the potential negative consequences of being caught in a lie than to the possible positive consequences of being observed in a truth. Whether such information will influence behavioral decisions in the first place, however, will depend on whether or not the individual has been socialized to view society as a reference group in the definition of morality (see Toby, 1957) . Among individuals who value the opinions of society, deviating from normative prescriptions by being dishonest should create meaningful threats to identity. As a result, these individuals should avoid telling lies. Among individuals who do not value the views of society, dishonesty could be viewed as an informative description of who they are, but it should not translate into a meaningful identity threat. Such individuals should thus have few identity barriers to lying. They might then base their decision on whether to lie on other concerns, such as the likelihood that the lie might yield a desirable result.
Avoiding the negative. In summary, reference groups give actions meaning by clarifying what is expected of members. Those who value the group will typically conform to the norm, but this conformity reflects a desire to avoid a negative identity, not a desire to seek a positive identity. Because of this, groups should extract conformity from their members by setting up a negative incentive system that punishes deviance, not by setting up a positive incentive system that rewards conformity. Thus, a civil society should not try to reward people who engage in lawful acts, but it should instead try to punish people who engage in unlawful acts. Consistent with this, negative reward structures typically are observed in criminal justice systems, whereas positive reward structures typically are not (Lemert, 1951; Tannenbaum, 1951) . Similar negative incentive systems exist in the informal mechanisms of social control. In general, societies create negative labels to contaminate the identities of those who break the rules, not positive labels to purify the identities of those who follow them (Becker, 1963; Hughes, 1945; Kitsuse, 1962) . Interestingly, if a civil society were to try to reward civilized acts, it could undermine its own efforts by implying that such acts are not truly expected of all members. From the logic of conversational norms, a society that communicates what it wants by emphasizing what it desires inadvertently communicates the belief that its wants are the exception to the rule (Stuart & Blanton, 2003) .
Further evidence of the negative incentive structure surrounding conformity can be found in a number of now classic studies of informal pressure in small groups. These studies demonstrated that, when groups seek uniformity of action, conformity pressure takes the form of social sanctions levied against deviants who get out of line, not the form of social rewards given to those who toe it (Festinger, Gerard, Hymovitch, Kelley, & Raven, 1952; Festinger & Thibaut, 1951; Hensley & Duval, 1976; Schachter, 1951) . This tendency to punish deviants has further been shown to vary as a function of the group's need for conformity. For instance, those with a conservative mindset who are most interested in preserving the rules of the group also appear to be the ones who are the least tolerant of deviants (Wilson, 1973) . Moreover, situations that heighten the pressure to conform also heighten the tendency to punish deviants (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991) . Interestingly, a negative incentive system can emerge when opinions of the group are not known but simply inferred from observed within-group uniformity. An illustration of this can be found in the classic studies of Asch (1956) . In social psychology textbooks, these studies are typically described as showing evidence of "normative social influence," because students presumably conformed out of a desire for social approval from other students. It seems unlikely, however, that students conformed because they thought conformity would yield approval in the form of praise and admiration. Rather, they probably conformed out of a desire to avoid the social rejection that might follow were they to deviate from the norms of the group. In short, the "approval" we experience when our actions conform to others' expectations is most typically expressed by the absence of disapproval, not by the presence of approval. In fact, expressions of approval for normative acts can be taken as insults, because they suggest that the approver held the approved to a standard that was lower than the norm (Graham, 1990; Meyer, 1992) .
Internalizing avoidance. The tendency for participants in the Asch (1956) studies to avoid the disapproval of incidental others shows the importance that we place on being accepted. We often care so much about others' opinions that we give mere acquaintances temporary referent status. A more powerful demonstration of our concern for approval can be found in our tendency to conform to the normative expectations of meaningful others, even when they are not observable in the immediate social environment. Because reference groups create a symbolic system for evaluating the self, members of meaningful groups do not have to be physically present to initiate a negative incentive system that encourages conformity. Through socialization, the normative expectations of important reference groups are internalized in the form of self-evaluative standards (Jones & Gerard, 1967; see Higgins & Silberman, 1998; Moretti & Higgins, 1999) . These standards are then used by the individual to evaluate the goodness or badness of possible behavioral alternatives, even when group members are not present to express their opinions.
Recently, Higgins and colleagues have shown that the internalized expectations of reference groups, what they term "ought selfguides," engage an internal avoidance-based self-regulatory system (Foerster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998) . Accordingly, people experience negative emotional states when they fail to live up to their internalized standards of correctness. The "positive" emotional states they experience when they live up to these standards are nothing more than the absence of the negative emotional states they would have experienced had they fallen short of these standards. It thus appears that people regulate their actions in relation to ought selfguides by avoiding the actions that would create negative identities, not by seeking the actions that would create positive identities (see Higgins, 1997 Higgins, , 1999 , for reviews). The work of Higgins and colleagues illustrates why, in this article, we do not differentiate when people engage in acts out of a desire to manage a public self-image versus a private self-image. The standards people hold themselves to are often little more than the internalized opinions of meaningful others. This is not to say, however, that the presence of others in the immediate social context will not alter a person's actions. In fact, observers often cause people to act in ways that run counter to their internalized standards of correctness. Others do this, however, by altering the evaluative standards that are made salient and that are viewed as relevant during the behavioral decision process.
We can assume that past socialization with meaningful reference groups leads to the development of chronically accessible (and often "private") standards (e.g., Higgins & Silberman, 1998; Moretti & Higgins, 1999) . These standards exert stable influences on action across a variety of situations. We can also assume that temporarily accessible (and often "public") standards are activated through immediate interactions with meaningful others (Baumeister, 1982; Schlenker, 1986; Tedeschi, 1989) . These two sources of information can then be integrated in a systematic fashion to conjointly influence action tendencies in a given situation. A fruitful area for future research will be determining the principles that dictate how temporarily and chronically accessible standards are combined to influence behavioral decisions. It is not clear at present how this takes place (cf. Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986) . For now, it is sufficient to state that both temporarily and chronically accesssible norms operate through much the same decision process, once activated, but that the relative influence of each will vary from situation to situation.
Once we accept the notion that people evaluate their actions relative to internalized norms, the model of private self-esteem that emerges from the reference group literatures is one that portrays those with "high" self-esteem as those who are "not low" in self-esteem. This is because, when we internalize standards leading us to expect certain behaviors from the self, the actions that lead to strong evaluative moments are those in which we fall short of our own expectations. Consistent with this, research suggests that self-esteem is damaged more by exceptional exclusion than it is from normative inclusion. A common finding in laboratory situations in which participants are either accepted or rejected by similar peers is that rejection increases negative affect and diminishes selfesteem, whereas acceptance has relatively little impact (e.g., Fenigstein, 1979; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995) . In short, normal acceptance often has little influence on self-evaluations, even when the alternative to this would evoke strong reactions. As a result, the positive identities we obtain from reference groups are often nothing more than the absence of the negative identities that we would have obtained had we not received this approval. Thus, the directive force of reference groups will often originate in their ability to reject deviant acts, not their ability to embrace normative acts.
Reference ideals. It thus appears that reference groups are a largely negative force in our lives. They tell us what is expected of us, and they move us in desired directions using a system of punishments and social sanctions. There is, however, an obvious problem with this analysis. We know from personal experience that we often choose courses of action to promote positive identities, not just to avoid negative identities. Some actions make us feel good about ourselves. They lead to feelings of positive affect in the form of pride, excitement, and self-satisfaction. We also know from personal experience that much of the positive meaning in our lives reflects the internalized values of meaningful others. Our families and our social institutions tell us what is good and what is worthy. For a reference group model of action and identity to be complete, it must evolve to where it can explain these experiences as well.
Reference group theory has probably failed to emphasize the positive because it developed out of theories emphasizing the psychological benefits of conformity (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1950) . Although groups will often seek conformity for desired actions, this is not always the case. Groups will often value acts but fall short of expecting them of all members. To explain, it is important to distinguish between two normative functions served by reference groups. Virtually all of the research and theory in the reference group tradition has focused on what we might term norms of correctness. These are the codes of conduct that give individuals a sense of what they should or should not do in a given situation. In short, they tell the individual what is both desired and required to be a member in good standing. Norms of correctness have been captured by Higgins's notion of ought self-guides (Higgins, 1987) . They have also been referred to as prescriptive norms (D. T. Miller & Prentice, 1996) , injunctive norms (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) , and subjective norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) . The second normative function is similar to the first in that it reflects a regulatory influence of the group. The difference is that this second norm comes into play for actions that the group desires but does not require. This process, termed idealization, occurs when a group views an action as desirable but when it does not view conformity as necessary for eliciting desired rates of behavior.
Reference groups will idealize acts for a number of reasons. First, many of the acts that a group desires are not needed in order for the group to function. For instance, a society may place a high value on musical and athletic accomplishment, and so it may want to encourage these pursuits. However, musicians and athletes are not needed to maintain the social order, and so most societies will not require these pursuits from all members. Second, many of the acts that are needed for a group to function are not needed from all members of the group. For instance, a civil society may need its citizens to follow the laws of the land, but it will not need all of its citizens to work as law enforcement officers. Because some law enforcement officers are needed to preserve civil order, however, society should create a reward structure that encourages minority participation in this pursuit. Finally, many of the acts that a group desires will not be required of all members because, quite simply, all members in the group will not be able to perform the desired act. It is the nature of many desirable acts that only a few people have the requisite skills or ability levels necessary to engage in them. For instance, society may value the musical genius of Mozart or the athleticism of Michael Jordan, but it could not expect all of its citizens to live up to these standards. By holding these two examples in unusually high regard, however, society can encourage other talented individuals to try to follow in these footsteps.
In summary, a group may view an action as desirable but then fall short of requiring it of all members. In these instances, conformity pressure will not develop, but the behavior's prevalence can be increased through a social influence process, termed idealization. Idealization occurs when an act is given a high value, such that it will provide the actor with an identity that is worthy of praise and admiration. Thus, someone deciding whether to pursue a course of action should be more likely to decide in the affirmative if a meaningful reference group idealizes that act.
Seeking the positive. With respect to deviance regulation, the primary difference between the decision process surrounding idealized acts versus required acts is the direction of the informational asymmetry. With a required act, the socially desirable action is normative and the socially undesirable alternative is deviant. With an idealized act, the socially undesirable act is normative and the socially desirable alternative to that act is deviant. The reason for the direction of the asymmetry with ideals is in large part due to the social construction of acts that are worthy of being idealized. Ideals are created to encourage acts that personify rare or extreme qualities in the actor, and so one generally does not expect to see people possess them (see Reeder & Brewer, 1979) . We should thus find it more surprising and more informative when people exhibit evidence of the ideal than when they exhibit evidence of its absence. In support of this, research indicates a robust positivity bias in social perception around abilities and competencies (Skowronksi & Carlston, 1989) . That is, we typically view instances of high ability as more diagnostic of a person's under-lying talents than instances of low ability (Martijn, Spears, Van der Plight, & Jakobs, 1992; Skowronksi & Carlston, 1987) . Recall that this structure is the reverse with actions imbued with normative expectation, such as ethicality.
As a result of this asymmetry, we would expect a person trying to decide whether or not to pursue an ideal to base this decision more on the perceived benefits of attaining the ideal than on the perceived costs of falling short of the ideal. Of course, this decision process may be influenced by any number of other considerations, including an analysis of ability level and efficacy beliefs. When these factors are held constant, however, we expect people to pursue their ideals based more on their hopes that they might embody the ideal than on their concerns that they might not. We should also expect the social influence process to be one that sets up positive incentives for ideal acts, not negative incentives for avoiding normative acts. One way in which this can be done is through the creation of positive role models. By praising the identity of those few people who embody an ideal, others in the group may decide to engage in similar pursuits (see Berger, 1977) . A role model's example will not be relevant to all members of the group, however. Those who will typically be most affected are the ones who share enough distinct similarity with the role model that they can imagine themselves attaining the same outcome (Festinger, 1954) . In fact, if a role model's actions appealed to enough people that it had normative accessibility, this person's example should no longer be viewed as informative, and so it should no longer influence behavior.
As with normative expectations, the ideals of meaningful groups can be internalized in the form of evaluative standards that guide behavior. Consistent with deviance regulation, research conducted by Higgins (1987 Higgins ( , 1997 Higgins ( , 1999 on "self-guides" indicates that the internalization of ideals creates an internal approachbased self-regulatory system. People strive toward their ideals in pursuit of the positive emotional experiences that come with success, not away from the negative emotional experiences that might follow failure. Thus, a reference group model of self-esteem that focuses on ideals predicts that people with high self-esteem feel truly good about the success they have had in pursuit of their ideals. These actions will be sources of pride, pleasure, and self-satisfaction. In contrast, a person who fails to live up to ideals, while feeling some sense of dejection for having failed to achieve these positive outcomes, should nonetheless escape the negative affect associated with failing to live up to normative expectations.
3
Deviance Regulation: Theory and Boundary Conditions
Theory
What emerges from this review is a dualincentive regulatory system by which people maintain desirable identities by pursuing actions that live up to socialized ideals and by avoiding actions that violate socialized prescriptions. Clearly, this model draws on the behavioral self-regulation framework of Higgins (1997 Higgins ( , 1999 , and much of our theoretical view can be fit within his. Our model also draws on mainstream psychological research and theory related to causal attribution (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972) , self-representation (e.g., McGuire & McGuire, 1980) , social comparison (Mullen & Goethals, 1990) , person perception (Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Skowronksi & Carlston, 1987) , and social prototypes . Our goal in the development of our perspective was to integrate these views with both more narrow and more broad purposes in mind. Narrowly, we sought to develop a theory relating actions to identities. This theory is more limited in its application than its psychological foundations because it is constrained to predict behavioral choices when identity concerns predominate. Broadly, we used basic psychological mechanisms to apply a level of analysis that is more typical in sociological and early social psychological traditions (Hyman & Singer, 1968; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Sherif & Sherif, 1964; Singer, 1981) . We drew on a set of basic psychological mechanisms to reveal social developmental factors that shape identity pursuit, and we showed how the nature of this pursuit lends a common structure to all variety of social forces.
The key features of the resulting theory are shown in Table 1 . When a reference group desires a given response and requires it of its members, the normative act will be the socially desirable action, and the deviant act will be the socially undesirable action. In this context, the informative act would be the socially undesirable act. Reference groups should thus influence behavioral choices by engaging a negative incentive system that punishes deviance. People who value the group should thus show internalization of this system through the development of ought self-guides. The ultimate effect of this socialization process will be the tendency to avoid deviating by conforming to the expectations of the group. The individual who succeeds in these efforts will attain positive self-regard, as expressed by the absence of negative selfviews. In contrast, when a reference group desires a given response but falls short of requiring it of all members, it can increase the prevalence of the act through the process of idealization. In this context, the normative act will be the socially undesirable action, and the deviant act will be the socially desirable action. As a result, the informative act will be the socially desirable act. Reference groups should thus influence behavioral choices by engaging a positive incentive system that rewards deviance. People who value the group should thus show internalization of this system through the development of ideal self-guides. The ultimate effect of this socialization process will be the tendency to deviate from norms in pursuit of ideals. The individual who succeeds in these efforts will attain positive self-regard, as expressed by the presence of positive self-views.
We are thus proposing that a dual-motivational system structures the pursuit of a meaningful identity within an accepted reference structure. This framework gives equal emphasis to both motivations, with some social contexts favoring the pursuit of a positive identity and others favoring the avoidance of a negative identity. Which incentive system will drive behavior will depend on individual and contextual factors, both of which alter the salience and the framing of incentives to act. Despite the importance of both motivational systems for the self, it appears that there will be a tendency for people to be more concerned with avoiding the negative, in contexts that engage the avoidance system, than they will be with attaining the positive, in contexts that engage the approach system. This is because the avoidance-based regulatory system is engaged by feelings of social obligation and responsibility. Failing to avoid the negative when it is required by the group can lead to an identity that does not meet the minimum requirements necessary for social inclusion. In contrast, the approach-based regulatory system is engaged by what we might term "optional ideals." These are the positive distinctions people can choose to pursue or choose not to pursue, depending on their ability and interest levels. Failing to attain a positive can lead to an identity that is less good than the identity of people who succeed, but there should be fewer social ramifications for failing to achieve positives than failing to avoid negatives. In support of this prediction, it appears that people are more strongly motivated to avoid negatives than to achieve positives (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Taylor, 1991) . The relative strength of these two incentives aside, the full model of self-esteem that emerges from our perspective is one that takes the needs of both self-regulatory systems into account. The highest levels of self-esteem should therefore be achieved by people who successfully avoid all of the negatives, as required by their reference groups, and who also succeed at some noteworthy subset of the optional ideals, as is desired by their reference groups. By living up to the oughts, people avoid exclusion. By achieving some of the ideals, people gain praise and admiration. Although the second outcome may not have as important a social ramification as the first, both types of successes should be needed for people to achieve the highest levels of self-esteem within a reference group structure. Table 1 presents the formal predictions for DRT. We expect these predictions to hold in most decision contexts in which the individual is (a) choosing between different courses of actions, (b) basing decisions on identity concerns, and (c) relatively free to initiate the preferred choice of action. We are confident that DRT will generalize across a wide range of social contexts, because the psychological mechanisms underlying it are so fundamental as to suggest near universal application. Although the predictions in Table 1 are somewhat complex, they arise from the use of just two basic psychological mechanisms: (a) a cognitive-perceptual mechanism, deviance regulation, that influences the information value of an action, and (b) a socialization mechanism, the internalization of reference group norms, that determines when informative acts are seen as meaningful. We assert that all individuals possess a perceptual mechanism that makes a deviant act more informative than a normative act, and that all individuals have been socialized by meaningful others to assign different meanings to different acts. As a result, we expect all individuals to possess the basic dual-incentive selfregulatory system undergirding the predictions in Table 1 .
Boundary Conditions
Our confidence notwithstanding, we do appreciate that future research will reveal conditions under which DRT fails to make accurate predictions. Following common advice for those pursuing theory development (e.g., Birnbaum, 1984; Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986; McGuire, 1973) , we view the clarification of boundary conditions as just as critical to the survival of this theory as the clarification of its core predictions (see Pelham & Blanton, 2002) . Although our past research has been conducted under conditions favorable to its predictions, we anticipate that boundary conditions will be identified in the future. As a possible example, we expect that the advice of DRT might backfire when targets of influence resist change. DRT assumes that individuals will be mostly cooperative recipients of influence and that, as a result, they will be persuaded to the greatest degree by messages that adopt the most informative message frame. It seems likely, however, that targets of communications will often resist attempts to alter their actions (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) . This might be especially true the more informative the message. If so, the application of this theory might unwittingly contribute to a literature on "anti-conformity" instead of a literature on social influence (see Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000) . Just as people often turn to meaningful others to define what is of value, they often turn to undesirable others, what Newcomb (1950) referred to as "negative reference groups," to define what is devalued. Anti-conformity could thus be uncovered by researchers who apply DRT to influence individuals, if the communicators in their studies are viewed by their participants as negative referents. We do not have precise predictions about how research such as this will play itself out, but it might reveal many situations in which DRT predictions backfire, moving individuals away from the predicted responses.
As a second possible example where DRT might not apply, we point to its prediction that self-esteem will be driven more by a concern for ought pursuit than ideal pursuit. This prediction was made because ought pursuit is regulated by social obligation, whereas ideal pursuit is regulated by individual choice. This prediction may not apply, however, when trying to predict the self-esteem of individuals who have had extreme success at achieving ideals. People who win acclaim for extreme achievements may be forgiven for transgressions that would be considered mandatory behavior in others. Examples that come to mind involve star athletes and movie celebrities who violate norms of correctness but who are still widely accepted by others. DRT is probably little use for predicting the identity concerns of individuals such as these. It is best used for predicting self-esteem of people who have to play by the "rules of the game" given to them by their reference groups. As Snyder and Fromkin (1980) have pointed out, however, people who achieve unusual levels of success may be allowed to "change the game" and can therefore stick out from the crowd in ways that would cause most others to be rejected (see also Hollander, 1961; Lemaine, 1974) .
We have suggested two boundary conditions, but many others may apply as well. Despite our expectation that future research will uncover additional boundary conditions for our theory, we still believe that it offers a flexible blueprint for predicting social behavior across a wide array of social contexts. We have thus presented it in a largely unqualified form, out of the hope that this will permit constructive theory testing of its central predictions. We fully expect that this pursuit will at times reveal boundary conditions that we have not yet anticipated. Before such research is pursued, however, we would like to address two potential boundary conditions that we have anticipated and that we suspect will be entertained by others. First, we expect concerns that DRT will not generalize to non-Western cultures, and second, we expect concerns that DRT will not generalize to the maintenance of collective identities. Although there are sound theoretical reasons to expect that each of these boundary conditions might apply, a careful review of the literature suggests otherwise. More important, this review suggests that DRT reveals commonalities across cultures and across levels of self-representation that previously have been given little emphasis. In the following two sections, we outline the reasons why others might predict these boundary conditions, and we then present evidence arguing against them.
Culture as a Potential Boundary Condition
The last decade has seen a flurry of theory and research arguing that many of the assumed fundamentals within social psychology are not so fundamental after all (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995; Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; J. G. Miller, 1984; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; Triandis, 1989) . The most influential of these new research traditions, and the one with the most relevance to DRT, is the reanalysis of self and identity theory growing out of a seminal article by Markus and Kitayama (1991) . Markus and Kitayama proposed that the "West" (i.e., North America and Western Europe) promotes an independent view of the self. The person with this selfconstrual sees the self as a bounded and autonomous unit and maintains an independent identity by seeking further distinctions between self and other. In contrast, they proposed, the "East" (i.e., East Asia) promotes an interdependent view of self. The person with this self-construal sees the self as an interconnected collection of relationships and maintains an interdependent identity by seeking shared definitions with others. Markus and Kitayama (1991) asserted that current theories of self and identity are limited to the Western view. Accordingly, social psychologists have largely ignored or been unaware of the Eastern view, and this has led to blind spots in their theories. This criticism is relevant to our own theory. We admit that DRT was developed entirely out of research emanating from the West. The obvious disadvantage of building a theory in this way is that it probably does contain cultural biases that we fail to see. As already stated, however, the foundations of this theory are so basic that, barring new evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that it has application across a wide range of cultures. More to the point, a great deal of current evidence, which we review here, suggests that DRT not only generalizes across cultures but that it also provides an informative account of many of the East-West differences that have justified the current reanalysis of self.
In earlier sections, we showed how DRT can be used to understand the influence that society has on the actions of the individual. In these analyses, we focused on within-society differences in obligation for different behaviors. Specifically, we argued that a society will typically place greater requirements on morality-based actions than on ability-based actions. As a result, we argued that individuals will maintain desirable identities by avoiding acts that society defines as morally wrong and by approaching those acts that it defines as indicative of ability ideals. In a similar fashion, DRT can be used to compare the ways in which different societies lead to cultural differences in action.
4 Although there will be a great deal of variability in the expectations surrounding different behaviors within any given society, there will also be a great deal of variability between societies in their expectations more generally. Specifically, there is strong evidence to suggest that Eastern societies, as compared with Western societies, set up contingency structures that require more of what they desire.
As shown subsequently, there is also strong evidence to suggest that differences in obligation lead to the cultural differences in action that would be predicted by DRT. Specifically, we show that the tendency in the East to require more of what is desired leads to greater tendencies in the East than the West to conform to social norms. Although such behavioral tendencies are predicted by other cross-cultural theories of action and identity (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) , we document that the patterning of behavior fits the precise patterning that would be predicted from Table 1 . The first step in our analysis is to document that there are cultural differences in the tendency to require. Once this is done, we show how these differences alter the patterning of behavioral outcomes in ways that are consistent with DRT.
Eastern oblige. Even a casual review of Eastern cultures reveals a tendency to emphasize civic and social responsibility. Despite the ease with which compelling anecdotes might be generated to support this view, it is admittedly difficult making pointed comparisons between Eastern and Western societies on this-or any other-dimension. The nature and structure of the social institutions that sanction and regulate actions in Eastern countries vary to an extreme degree from nation to nation. Provisional crosscultural comparisons can be conducted, however, provided that the portrait of the "East" is limited to countries in the Far East-specifically, China, Japan, and Korea-and provided that the portrait of the "West" is limited to Western Europe and North America. These three Eastern countries have received a great deal of empirical attention in the current reexaminations of self theory, and so this rough categorization scheme can yield informative comparisons with the literature. Although China, Japan, and Korea differ radically from one another in their formal social institutions, they share a common cultural heritage in Confucianism, which remains a fundamental structuring influence on socialization practices in modern China (Ho, 1996; Wu, 1996) , modern Japan (Mita, 1992) , and modern Korea (U. Kim & Choi, 1994 ). An inspection of these practices reveals an emphasis on cultivating feelings of personal responsibility for a wide range of social behaviors at a level that is not typical in Western Europe or North America.
One of the guiding principles in the Confucian system of beliefs is the notion of filial piety. As the Confucian scholar Yan Pohu Lee wrote, "The family regulations are such that as soon as a child begins to understand, he is not only taught to obey, but also loses his freedom of action" (Yan Phou Lee, 1861, as cited in Dardess, 1991, p. 77) . This quotation recalls earlier discussions about the power of meaningful reference groups to narrow the range of actions and to extract conformity around normative expectations. To the extent that personal actions are restricted in this way, the Confucian system of belief is quite clear about the types of actions that are expected. First and foremost, children are expected to respect and honor the dictates of parents and family elders. At first blush, it might appear that this emphasis would only influence actions within the family, but, in the East, "honoring family" also requires ac- 4 In this article, we do not seek a distinction between "culture" and "society" because we view societal institutions as inextricably bound to the cultures in which they emerge, and vice versa (cf. Rohner, 1984; Segall, 1984) . However, there are informative comparisons one might make between the formal and informal agencies that regulate actions (typically thought of as "society") and the less directive forces that alter the meanings of the acts that are elicited (typically thought of as "culture"; see D 'Andrade, 1984) . In most instances, DRT encourages considerations of the institutions that regulate actions (e.g., family structure, government structure, penal codes, and religious belief), rather than the meaning systems that define actions. tions that will sustain and maintain the family's status within society at large. Thus, children are expected to respect and obey social authorities, to observe community standards and morals, to live up to the expectations that arise from their ascribed and attained roles, and to bring honor to the family through personal achievement. Evidence that East Asian socialization leads to far-ranging acceptance of societal expectations can be seen in the oft-cited tendency for Asian cultures to have what has been termed a "tight" structure, in which their members endorse and observe traditional codes of conduct and morality (Triandis, 1989) .
Further support for the hypothesized emphasis in social responsibility can be found in the "psychological markers" it leaves on those in the East. The emerging cross-cultural literature suggests that Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans differ from Western Europeans and North Americans in their self-descriptions in ways that indicate a socialized concern for living up to the expectations of respected others. Those in the East more typically represent the self in terms of its social roles and its relational expectations (Ip & Bond, 1995; Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990) . Similarly, there is a tendency for those socialized in the East to incorporate their feelings of responsibility, duty, and obligation into their representations of close others (Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996; Yeh, 1995) . East Asians also appear to be more attentive and elaborate social perceivers (Ji, Schwarz, & Nisbett, 2000; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1999) . These tendencies are functional in societies that require, because they can help the individual see social obligations that are embedded in the social environment.
In summary, evidence from a variety of sources suggests a tendency for Eastern societies to emphasize social responsibility. Although the exact magnitude of this effect is hard to pin down, differences across cultures in socialization practices and in consensual social constructions suggest that there are broad tendencies in the East to require more of what is desired than in the West. According to DRT, this should lead to cultural differences in social action and influence.
Action and identity in the East. The crosscultural literature suggests that there is a greater motivation to conform in the East than in the West (e.g., Bond & Smith, 1996; Burns & Brady, 1992; H. Kim & Markus, 1999) . Although this difference might suggest a need for a completely different model of action and identity (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) , numerous findings from various research programs suggest instead that the conformity tendencies in the East are consistent with what would be predicted by DRT, given the Eastern tendency to require. DRT predicts, for instance, that a society of requirements will motivate individuals to conform out of a desire to avoid an undesirable identity, not out of a desire to obtain a desirable identity. Consistent with this, research indicates that those in the East more typically define their positive traits as the absence of negative traits, not as the presence of positive traits (Yeh, 1995) . This suggests support for the predicted self-esteem goal of avoiding negative identities in social contexts that require what is desired. As further evidence, members of Eastern cultures report that they expect greater emotional experience following failures, relative to successes, whereas members of Western cultures often report the reverse (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000) . These tendencies appear especially strong when it comes to social failures (Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Lai, 1999; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995) . Those in the East also report greater motivation to avoid negative outcomes and greater changes in esteem resulting from failures, whereas those in the West report greater motivation to achieve positive outcomes and greater changes in esteem resulting from successes (Elliott, Chirkove, Kim, & Sheldon, 2001; Kitayama et al., 1997) . Apparently for these reasons, those in the East appear more focused on self-criticisms than self-enhancement, a tendency that has been interpreted as a strategy of monitoring to avoid failure (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997) . They also prefer negative role models who embody the undesirable qualities they wish to avoid than more positive role models who embody the desirable qualities they wish to attain (Lockwood & Marshall, 2003) .
Each of the findings cited in the previous paragraph is consistent with a theoretical account that assumes that those in the East are socialized to consider how their acts might spoil their identities (as a result of deviating from normative requirements), not how they might advance their identity (as a result of deviating toward normative ideals). Despite the preoccupation with avoiding failure, however, those in the East appear less distressed than those in the West to a particular type of failure. Specifically, they appear less concerned than those in the West with falling short of their ideals . This is consistent with the notion that Western societies place greater importance than Eastern societies on idealized pursuits. Also consistent with this view, those socialized in the East appear more responsive than those socialized in the West to negatively framed persuasive communications, whereas those socialized in the West appear more responsive than those socialized in the East to positively framed communications (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Lee et al., 2000) .
In summary, a great deal of the variability in behavioral motivation that has been documented in the current cross-cultural literature supports the predictions in DRT. This suggests that, insofar as culture does place boundary conditions on the application of this theory, these conditions have not been revealed by the current reanalysis of the self. More important, it suggests that DRT can have a great deal of utility guiding future research in the cultural and cross-cultural traditions.
Level of Self-Representation as a Potential Boundary Condition
Many mainstream social psychological theories of the self, most notably social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its extension self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) , contend that the self-concept shifts between representations in terms of personal or individual identities and representations in terms of collective or relational identities. A similar assumption exists in the various cross-cultural theories of self just reviewed. These theories argue that Eastern cultures encourage collective self-representations, whereas Western cultures encourage individualistic selfrepresentations (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989) . Although there are important distinctions between the different psychological theories that emphasize self-representational shifts (see also Brewer, 1991 Brewer, , 1993 Brewer & Pickett, 1998) , most share the assumption that, when the self-concept is represented at the level of the collective, self-evaluations are based on the evaluations of salient collective identities (see Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) .
Given that DRT was designed to explain the behavioral decision process as it relates to the maintenance of personal identities, it seems reasonable to predict that it would not apply when people strive to maintain collective identities. To the contrary, we argue that the same decision process applies, regardless of the level of selfrepresentation. We assume that individuals in all social and sociocultural contexts possess some representational identity that draws a distinction between a notion of "self" and a notion of "other" (Hofstede, 1980) . In fact, the basic psychological principles underlying the evaluative process tell us that, for theories even to consider self-evaluation, they have to assume that the evaluators hold two nonoverlapping mental representations. First, they must hold some representation of the self that is being evaluated. Second, they must hold some representational standard (or "anchor") against which this self is evaluated (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) . In certain evaluative contexts, the representation of self might be based on personal attributes and the standard against which it is evaluated might be based on the attributes of similar others. In different evaluative contexts, the representation of self might be based on the attributes of in-groups and the standard against which it is evaluated might be based on the attributes of meaningful out-groups (see Blanton, 2001 ).
In summary, a great deal of the cognitive dynamics underlying self-evaluation remain the same whether the self is represented in terms of its individual or its collective attributes. If we further assume that, regardless of level of representation, most individuals want to maintain a desirable identity (cf. Swann, 1987 , and see Footnote 2), we have reason to predict that a great deal of the motivational dynamics surrounding the self will remain the same as well. Thus, individuals who have choice over their collectives should seek membership in distinct (minority) groups that have positive identities and they should avoid membership in distinct (minority) groups that have negative identities. In contrast, they should be unconcerned about the value of normative (majority) groups.
In support of these predictions, research indicates that, just as people appear to identify more with their distinct personal attributes than their common attributes (e.g., Ditto & Griffin, 1993; McGuire & McGuire, 1980) , they also appear to identify more with their distinct groups than their common groups (Abrams, 1994; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Mullen, 1991; Turnbull et al., 1990) . Similarly, they are more likely to self-stereotype the basis of group memberships when membership in a group is distinct as opposed to common (Simon & Hamilton, 1994; cf. von Hippel, Hawkins, & Schooler, 2001 ). The distinctiveness of a group plays such a central role in the formation of an identity, in fact, that D. T. Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1988) suggested that sharing a distinct attribute with another person can be used in the laboratory to operationalize a "minimal reference group" (p. 916). Using just such a methodology, Brewer and Weber (1994) demonstrated that laboratory participants, who were given the same minimal in-group assignment as a confederate, subsequently based their self-evaluations on their evaluations of the confederate when the shared in-group was distinct as opposed to common. Thus, upward social comparison with a distinct in-group member raised self-evaluation, and downward social comparison with a distinct in-group member lowered self-evaluation (see also Blanton, Christie, & Dye, 2002; Blanton, Crocker, & Miller, 2000; Brown, Novick, Lord, & Richards, 1992) . This would all suggest that the status of an in-group will have greater evaluative impact when it is distinct as opposed to common. Supporting this, Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg, and Wilke (1992) found that the status of an in-group had a greater effect on the rated attractiveness of a group among members when the group was distinct as opposed to common.
Evidence thus indicates, consistent with DRT, that people will be more concerned with avoiding membership in a devalued group and more interested in gaining membership in a valued group when membership in the group is counternormative as opposed to normative. Interestingly, DRT can be used not only to generate predictions about movement between groups, but it can also be used to generate predictions within groups. One prediction that follows, for instance, is that people will give greater weight during behavioral decisions to group opinions when these opinions relate to the counternormative aspects of the group's behavior, as opposed to the normative aspects of the group's behavior. On the basis of the principles of self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987) , a group that adopts what we might term a "deviant norm" (a behavioral pattern that runs counter to the behavioral norm in the surrounding social context) should become identified with such norms. As a result, individuals who fail to conform to deviant norms not only can fail to embody the essence of the group, they can also chip away at the group's distinct identity by moving it toward the surrounding norm (see Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000) .
For an individual who hopes to be "a member in good standing," special attention should thus be given to the opinions the group holds for these group-defining acts. This hypothesis was tested in a recent study in our own laboratory ). Participants were 251 undergraduates who completed a questionnaire assessing attitudes and perceptions related to seven different risk behaviors (casual sex, smoking marijuana, binge drinking, smoking cigarettes, cheating on graded assignments, getting into bar fights, and driving under the influence of alcohol). Participants first identified their "peer group," which was defined for them as "the small group of friends whose opinions you value and whose company you like to share." They then estimated the opinions peers held for each of the seven behaviors by rating "how beneficial versus harmful would it be to someone's 'image' within your peer group" to engage in each of the actions. Following this, they estimated the behavioral norms within the group by rating how many members engaged in each of the seven behaviors, and they rated their own intentions to engage in the behavior in the future. Consistent with our past research involving longitudinal designs (e.g., Blanton et al., 1997; Jaccard, Blanton, & Dodge, 2001) , we found that peer-group opinions and peer-group behavioral norms predicted future intentions, even after control for past behavior. This suggested that peers were a meaningful reference group for this sample, at least in their decisions related to risk taking. In the next round of analyses, we sought to determine whether these associations interacted with one another in ways suggested by DRT. Specifically, we tested whether the degree of association between peergroup opinions and future intentions was greater for actions in which the peer group's own norms deviated from the norms in the surrounding social context.
The norms in the surrounding social context were operationalized in two ways. First, we computed a surrounding behavioral norm for each act. We did this by computing the average in-group behavioral norm for each behavior. These analyses revealed, for instance, that most participants in the sample associated with peers who did not smoke cigarettes, but who did binge drink. DRT would thus predict that the sample would show greater conformity to the opinions of peers, with smoking, if most of their peers did smoke (because this norm within the peer group would deviate from the norms on campus) but that they would show greater conformity to the opinions of peers, with binge drinking, if most of their peers did not binge drink (because this norm within the peer group would deviate from the norms on campus).
Support for predictions can be found in Figure 4 , which shows a graphical representation of a three-way interaction among peer-group opinions, peer-group norms, and surrounding behavioral norms ( p Ͻ .01). The scale on the y-axis represents the beta weight for the level of within-individual association between peer-group opinions and future intentions (controlling for past behavior) across the seven behaviors. In short, this is a metric of the tendency to conform to peer-group opinions. As this figure reveals, conformity varied across the seven behaviors as a function of the behavioral norms in the participants' peer groups and the surrounding norms for a given behavior. Consistent with DRT, participants conformed to a greater degree to peer-group opinions when the opinions related to actions that were (a) normative within the peer group but counternormative on campus or (b) counternormative within the peer group but normative on campus. In a follow-up analysis, we used a second operationalization of the surrounding norm, based on the surrounding prescriptive norm. The surrounding prescriptive norm was assessed by asking participants to rate how positively or negatively "society" would evaluate a person who engages in each act. We again found a three-way interaction consistent with DRT ( p Ͻ .01). Specifically, there was greater conformity to the opinions of peers when the behavioral norms in the peer group deviated from the normative prescriptions in society.
In summary, DRT can be used to draw predictions about the maintenance of collective identities. This was demonstrated by research showing that (a) people appear to value membership in positively valued groups and devalue membership in negatively valued groups to a greater extent when these groups are minority as opposed to majority groups, and (b) people appear more concerned with conforming to reference group norms when they relate to actions that cause the reference group to deviate from other groups around it than when they do not. These findings suggest that DRT generalizes to the maintenance of collective identities and that it can be used in future research to gain further understanding of both intragroup and intergroup phenomena.
Rethinking the Person and the Situation
Having presented our theory and addressed some likely concerns about its limitations, we now illustrate how it can offer new insights into the social motives that drive individual actions and the power of the social context to alter these actions. In each case, we show how the view put forth by DRT differs from those of contemporary theories that are driving current research agendas. Our point in making comparisons with other theories is not to suggest that DRT should try to replace them. Rather, we make these comparisons in hopes of illustrating how DRT can offer a complement to current theoretical frameworks by highlighting a view of the personby-situation interaction that has received little emphasis within current theoretical traditions.
Social Motivations: Uniqueness, Similarity, or Compromise?
Recalling a statement by Bohr, McGuire (1973) noted that "there are trivial truths and great truths. The opposite of a trivial truth is plainly false. The opposite of a great truth is also true" (p. 455). The goal for social sciences, he argued, is to determine the contexts in which great truths are true and contexts in which their opposites are true. In this regard, two great opposing truths in psychology are as follows: People are motivated to be similar to others in their social environment and People are motivated to be unique in their social environment. The first truth was given emphasis in the early social psychological traditions of the 1950s and 1960s, which stressed the motive to conform to group norms (e.g., Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1950 Festinger, , 1954 Schachter, 1951) . It was also emphasized in the early sociological traditions that paralleled these themes (e.g., Becker, 1963; Hughes, 1945; Kitsuse, 1962) . The second truth was given less emphasis in social psychological and sociological theory, but it was central to the thinking behind the personality theories of that same time. Many of these theories argued that normal human development involves the pursuit of a unique and distinct identity (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Fromm, 1955; Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961) . Accordingly, people strive to stick out from those around them as a way of asserting a meaningful personal identity.
The first experimental work to address this apparent contradiction of motives was summarized in a book by Snyder and Fromkin (1980) , Uniqueness: The Human Pursuit of Difference. Snyder and Fromkin argued that people desire a unique identity, but these authors defined "unique" as a moderate degree of similarity between self and others. 5 In support of their claim, Snyder, Fromkin, and colleagues collected a great deal of evidence suggesting that people resist feedback indicating that they are "extremely similar" to others, just as they resist feedback indicating that they are "extremely 5 Snyder and Fromkin (1980) noted (p. 21 ) that by giving their theory the label "uniqueness theory," they risked the possibility that researchers would misinterpret their view as one arguing that people have a motive to achieve extreme uniqueness. To avoid this, they clearly stated that, "in this regard, we are not proposing that people have an unquenchable thirst and total desire to be different from their fellow humans. Rather, we would suggest that the pursuit of difference represents a striving to maintain a moderate sense of dissimilarity relative to other people" (p. 75). Despite their statement, and many studies designed to test this thesis, we have observed numerous citations that represent their theory as one that predicts extreme uniqueness. This suggests that the label "uniqueness theory" probably did encourage incorrect inferences, as they originally feared. different" from others (Ganster, McCuddy, & Fromkin, 1970; Fromkin, 1970 Fromkin, , 1972 Snyder & Endelman, 1980 ; for a recent review, see Lynn & Snyder, 2002) . This "compromise view" dominates current theoretical discourse about social motives. For instance, Brewer (e.g., Brewer, 1991 , 1993 Brewer & Pickett, 1998) has recently extended uniqueness theory to consider self-categorization processes. According to her more appropriately termed optimal distinctiveness theory, people counteract feelings of extreme similarity and extreme dissimilarity by altering their level of self-representation to achieve a moderate degree of self-other distinction. In support, she has shown that people move to individual-level self-representations following feedback indicating extreme similarity with others, thereby distinguishing the self from others, and that they move to group-level self-representations following feedback indicating extreme difference, thereby associating the self with others (see Brewer & Pickett, 1998 ; also see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) . The compromise view is also making inroads into cross-cultural psychology. Although the main theme in cross-cultural psychology is that uniqueness motives dominate in the West and similarity motives dominate in the East (e.g., Burns & Brady, 1992; H. Kim & Markus, 1999) , researchers have recently argued for a universal conflict between uniqueness and similarity motives. Cultures influence behavior, it is suggested, by altering the degree to which this compromise shifts in the favor of uniqueness versus similarity (e.g., Brewer & Pickett, 1998; Tafarodi & Swann, 1996; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000) .
DRT introduces a different view on similarity and uniqueness motives. Accordingly, people are not concerned either with difference or with similarity, and so there is no conflict in need of a compromise. Individuals are simply concerned with maintaining a desirable identity (i.e., an identity that will facilitate inclusion in meaningful groups). In this pursuit, they will seek difference when difference will generate positive views of the self, and they will avoid difference when difference can generate negative views of the self. Another way of stating this is that DRT differs from the three perspectives that preceded it in that it does not assume that there is any valence inherent in either similarity or difference: It is not good or bad to be different. Instead, DRT assumes that difference has the potential to hold valence: Difference can be good when it is associated with good attributes or bad when it is associated with bad attributes, but similarity can be neither good nor bad, regardless of the attributes associated with it.
As an example of where DRT differs from the compromise view, DRT would not predict that a star athlete, such as Michael Jordan, would feel burdened in any way with concerns that he is "too different" from others in his social environment. It is true that his actions on the basketball court have distinguished him from all others, and so he has good reason for feeling extremely different. However, his athletic accomplishments probably improve his standing in his important reference groups. As a second example, DRT would not predict that a study participant who is confronted with experimental feedback indicating "extreme similarity" would seek distinctions from others by taking an opportunity to be the only immoral individual in a group of people. Finally, DRT would not predict that individuals will try to achieve optimal distinctiveness by seeking membership in small, inclusive, and socially devalued groups. Choices such as these might resolve the proposed conflict between difference and similarity, but they would do so in ways that would diminish a person's identity. 6 Although anecdotes such as these suggest situations in which DRT predictions might hold and ones in which the compromise predictions might not, there are certainly situations in which the reverse will be true. Again, it is not our view that DRT must replace prevailing theoretical views in order to be viable. Laboratory studies have shown that extreme-similarity and ex-6 Snyder and Fromkin (1980) also argued that the valence of an outcome would alter its ability to address uniqueness needs. Specifically, they suggested that people would be more favorably disposed toward similarity when an action would bring them in association with socially desirable others and more favorably disposed toward uniqueness when an action would bring them in association with socially undesirable others (see pp. 57-62). Thus, they clearly thought that the compromise one would strike would be influenced by the valence of the responses available in the response set. Nevertheless, even this restrained view on compromise differs from DRT, which assumes that difference takes on a social value only when it is associated with a valenced trait. treme-difference feedback can lead people to move in the opposing directions, and so this suggests that the compromise view has domains in which it is appropriate. Moreover, laboratory studies have found support for the compromise view, even using experimental feedback that does not link actions to valenced traits. DRT is poorly equipped to explain these findings, just as compromise views are poorly equipped to explain the findings in our message-framing studies. This impasse suggests that both theories may be "correct" in their own domain but that there are boundary conditions under which one applies and the other does not (McGuire, 1973) . There is a need for future research to help identify the boundary conditions for these different views, because the current literature continues to offer conflicting perspectives. We find it interesting, for instance, that right at this time when contemporary cross-cultural theories are forwarding the view that the West is dominated by uniqueness motives, much of the applied research that is being conducted in the West is emphasizing conformity motives. As an example of the latter, a current trend in behavioral health interventions is to present (American) college students with information suggesting to them that unhealthy behaviors, such as binge drinking and substance use, are less common on college campuses than they think (Anderson & Milgram, 1997; Carter & Kahnweiler, 2000; Haines, 1996; Haines & Spear, 1996; Keeling, 2000) . The assumption underlying these interventions is that (Western) college students, once presented with information suggesting healthy norms, will conform to these norms to avoid the social isolation that their unhealthy acts might incur. Of course, if Western college students were driven by a desire for uniqueness-as the cross-cultural literature suggests-health campaigns such as these should encourage the pursuit of uniquely unhealthy behaviors.
Our point in highlighting opposing predictions in different research domains is not to challenge the validity of either area of inquiry. We point to these contradictions to show how different research traditions within psychology continue to endorse opposing motivational systems, just as they did in the 1950s and 1960s. It is our belief that DRT, when applied in conjunction with current compromise theories, can help to unify disparate research domains. Future research exploring the boundary conditions of each theoretical view will help research psychologists know when to import one set of assumptions and when to import another.
The Power of the Social Context
Local and distal influences. One of the appeals of DRT is that it can unify the study of local social influences (e.g., peer groups and persuasive communications) and more distal social influences (e.g., culture and social institutions). According to DRT, the decision process by which people gauge the meaning of their acts is the same, regardless of whether they compare their actions with the norms made temporarily accessible by the local social context or with the norms made chronically accessible by the enduring social context. By placing the proximal and distal determinants of behavior under the same theoretical umbrella, this theory can reveal commonalities in action and identity that may previously have gone unnoticed.
Of the two, distal determinants have received far less attention in mainstream social psychology than the proximal determinants. This has changed somewhat in the past decade, as increased attention has been given to cultural influences. DRT can contribute to these efforts by providing a new tool for carrying out studies at this level of analysis. It is important to note, however, that the assumptions underlying DRT differ radically from those underlying many cross-cultural theories. In DRT, social structure creates a social context that alters actions by 7 A possible resolution is suggested by Ditto and Griffin (1993) . The compromise predictions may apply when people make decisions related to the maintenance of their global sense of self, and the DRT predictions may apply when people make decisions related to the maintenance of specific self-conceptions. When people reflect on their personality very broadly, they may want to see signs that they have a moderately distinct constellation of traits. In these reflections, the desired identity will be one that promotes a relatively unique identity but that does not generate such a degree of uniqueness that it might promote social isolation. As has been suggested before, what is considered "too different" and "too similar" in these calculations may be influenced to a large degree by the individual's culture. At the level of specific behavioral decisions, however, people may be more focused on whether or not a specific act will cause a particular trait attribution to stick. In decisions carried out at this level, DRT may provide the best prediction. altering the social contingencies surrounding them. In contrast, Markus, Kitayama, and Heiman (1996) have argued that "culture should not be understood as context because context typically refers to 'that which surrounds' and seems to imply that culture is outside or can be separated from psychology or from people" (p. 863). They suggest further that the self and its cultural context are so deeply enmeshed with one another that neither should be isolated for study in the absence of the other (see also Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998) . Although this view has helped to illuminate the ways in which the person and the social environment interact to produce behavior, this is only one of a number of complementary perspectives that might be brought to bear to help us understand the influence of culture.
Unlike the position expressed by Markus et al. (1996) and by other cross-cultural theories that emphasize the constitutive function of culture (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; J. G. Miller, 1984; Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; Triandis, 1989) , DRT places no emphasis on the interplay between self-definition and social context. To the contrary, DRT assumes that the self and the social context are measurable entities that interact in predictable ways, regardless of culture. Specifically, it assumes that (a) distal influences act as social contexts that operate outside of and independent of the individual; 8 (b) individuals base their behavioral decisions on the contingencies of deviance, regardless of the social context; and (c) social contexts alter the individual's chosen actions by altering the social contingencies surrounding deviation.
In these ways, DRT, with its emphasis on the influence exerted by formal and informal social institutions, is more closely related to societal psychology (Himmelweit, 1990) than to mainstream cultural social psychology. Because different societies set up different social contingency structures that we can study (the first assumption just noted), DRT can thus be used to make relativistic predictions about societal differences in action. We have already illustrated how this might be done by showing how DRT offers new interpretations of established cultural differences in motivation and action. In truth, this theory makes many of the same crosscultural predictions as current culture theories, but it does so using a framework that asserts a testable and universal behavioral decision process (the second assumption) and a testable and universal mechanism of social influence (the third assumption). It can thus be used to examine aspects of decision and influence that might occur in all cultures. DRT predicts, for instance, that social influence attempts will be most effective, regardless of cultural context, if they are tailored to reveal the consequences of deviating rather than the consequences of conforming.
9 It is through its ability to predict universals such as these that DRT will perhaps make its greatest contribution to the field.
Negative frame shifts. As an illustration of a potential universal, we have recently been interested in a uniformity suggested by DRT. This theorized universal, which we term the "negative frame shift," is proposed as a fundamental aspect of effective social influence, whether it is carried out at the local or distal level. The basis for this phenomenon can be found in a simple observation about the relative stability of negatively framed versus positively framed social influence attempts. Consider, for the purpose of illustration, a program designed to increase the prevalence of "behavior X" in a targeted population. According to the theory, a negative frame should be used in contexts in which behavior X is the normative choice in the population of interest. Such communications would thus link a negative image to those in the minority who do not do X. If the influence attempt is successful, the number of people who engage in X will increase even further. This change, in turn, will reinforce the effectiveness of the negative frame that is already in place. As a point of comparison, now consider how this would change in contexts favoring a positive frame. A positive frame should be used if behavior X is the deviant choice in the population of interest. In such situations, positively framed communications should be used to link a positive image to those in the minority who do engage in X. If the influence attempt is successful, the number of people who engage in X will increase, which will undermine the effectiveness of the positive frame that has been put in place. As a result, the positive frame that brought about the change in behavior should be replaced with a negative frame, once the positive frame is so effective that it alters the prevailing norms.
In short, DRT predicts that negatively framed messages will be self-reinforcing over time, whereas positively framed messages will be self-eliminating. We expect that this shift from the positive to the negative will be a recurring theme in studies of social influence over time. It might be seen in the changing strategies used by individuals to promote innovative versus statusquo thinking, and it might be seen in the changing character of group influence as groups move from trying to attract versus retain members. In any number of instances, we expect that positively framed influence attempts will lose their impact as their own successes inadvertently create a regulatory structure that encourages negatively framed influence attempts. Such shifts should be especially likely if changing behavioral norms lead to corresponding changes in prescriptive norms. This will happen if people come to view it as a person's obligation to conform to the newly established behavioral norm.
Research has yet to determine whether this shift does or does not occur with regularity. We discussed this phenomenon not so much to make a definitive case for it. Rather, we used it to illustrate how DRT can promote the search for universal effects of the social environment. We contend that the negative frame shift is one of the many universals this theory might reveal in future applications.
Future Challenges and Future Promise
Although DRT holds great promise as a theoretical framework that can guide future inquiry, research will be needed to tackle a number of methodological challenges. Despite its long history in the field, reference group theory has yet to inspire psychometric inventories that can test its predictions. The most popular method to date applies a circular logic that can only confirm the importance of the construct. Specifically, reference status is confirmed on a group to the extent that the individuals under study conform to its norms (e.g., Merton & Kitt, 1950; Newcomb, 1950; Sherif & Sherif, 1964) . Accordingly, it is not possible for research to locate situations in which individuals confront the pull of compelling referents and yet resist. As an alternative, one might develop self-report measures. Currently, the most widely used reporting system that links reference opinions to behavioral outcomes is the subjective norm component of the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) . This method has been shown to have great utility in the prediction of behavior, but it does not provide the details needed to test the patterning of responses predicted by DRT. We have outlined our own research in this regard, which has involved a variety of self-report measures, including (a) the behavioral norm of a small informal social group (e.g., students' prevalence estimates for their peer group), (b) the behavioral norm surrounding the group (e.g., students' prevalence estimates for their college campus), (c) the prescriptive norms of a small informal social group (e.g., students' estimates of their peers' approval or disapproval), and (d) the prescriptive norm surrounding the group (e.g., students' estimates of societies' approval or disapproval).
Although this is a start, the shortcoming of all of these measures is that they assume that participants are aware of the influences that others are having on them. One of the basic lessons in social psychology, however, is that people often fail to see such influences. To get around difficulties with self-reports, we have also estimated the surrounding behavioral norm by taking the average of the local norms reported by participants' peers. Any number of similar indexes might be developed to assess aspects of the surrounding social context that structure meaning, outside of the individual's ability to report.
Once these psychometric issues are addressed, research should deal with some of the thornier methodological concerns we have not yet been able to address. As we have pointed out, for instance, strategies must be developed to determine how people integrate demands from multiple referents during the action and identity decision process. It seems likely that competing referents will be given different weight, as a function of their importance and of their chronic and temporary accessibility. Future research conducted both in the laboratory and the field will be needed to get more specific than this.
Despite these future challenges, DRT holds great promise as a theory that will generate new insights into social behavior. As we have shown, it draws on basic psychological foundations to integrate a wide array of psychological phenomena. It can help explain, for instance, why conformity pressure is negative in both informal groups and in formal social institutions, even though many of the other incentives that structure our lives and provide us with meaning are positive. We have also shown that this theory can reveal universals in the behavioral decision process that occurs across cultures, even while it predicts cultural differences in behavior. Similarly, we have shown how it can reveal aspects of the action and identity decision process that occur at both the individual and collective level of self-representation. In these ways, and despite the methodological challenges facing it, DRT holds the promise of fulfilling the role that Lewin (1951) accorded to mid-range theories. Mid-range theories make specific predictions across a wide range of situations, but they are not so general that they can be comfortable with any and all predictions in any and all situations.
The first principle in DRT is that, when determining a course of action, people who are concerned with the maintenance of a desirable identity will give greater weight to the consequences of deviating from norms than they will to the consequences of conforming to them. The second principle in DRT is that, when making these calculations, people will be most concerned with their standing relative to the norms of important reference groups. As we have shown, careful application of these straightforward principles can offer many new insights into all manners of social behavior.
